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SECTION 1983 AND FEDERALISM

In future cases the Court must keep in focus the proper balance between
principles of federalism and the protection of individual rights. The Court's
exclusion in Paul of an individual's reputational liberty interest from
fourteenth amendment protection, for example, is not justified by federalism
or pressing federal caseloads. The reduction in the scope of section 1983
jurisdiction is a desirable goal, and the clarification of interests protected
by section 1983 will be useful in allocating complaints between the state and
federal systems. Recognized federal interests, however, should continue to
receive federal protection and not be left solely to the states.
MICHAEL

J. DEWBERRY

INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF ENCUMBERED GIFTS:
THE ADVENT OF CRANE*
INTRODUCTION

For many years the Commissioner has closely scrutinized gifts of property
subject to indebtedness. In instances in which the donor remained liable for
the encumbrance, early decisions held that he had retained an income interest
in the transferred property, and the payment of the obligation by the donee
was treated as the receipt of a reserved portion of the income by the donor.,
When the transfer was made in trust, a similar result was reached under
section 677 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that the grantor
is taxed on any trust income that is applied toward his legal obligations.2
Sophisticated tax planners, however, soon devised techniques to avoid this
exposure and acldeved significant tax savings. 3
In response the Commissioner has begun to assert that an encumbered
gift is in fact a part-sale, part-gift.4 Under this characterization, the amount
of the encumbrance is realized by the donor in the transfer transaction, and
gain is recognized to the extent this amount exceeds his basis. This approach
is supported by the landmark Supreme Court decision of Crane U. Commissioner,5 which held that the amount realized in the sale of encumbered
property includes the sum of the encumbrance. However, the applicability
*EDrroR's NoTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best student note submitted in the Winter 1976 quarter.
1. See Estate of A.E. Staley, 136 F.2d 368, 1943-1 U.S.T.C. %9487, (1943).
2. For analysis of the application of 677, see Commentary, Tax Consequences of
Funding Trusts With Encumbered Property: The Demise of Section 677, 28 U. FLA. L. REV.
708 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Estate of Annette S. Morgan, 37 T.C. 981 (1962), aff'd per curiam, 316
F.2d 238 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 827 (1963).
4. See, e.g., Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. %9475 (N.D.
Miss. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
5. 31 U.S. 1, 1947-1 U.S.T.C. %9217 (1947).
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of this principle to transactions other than sales remained undecided until

the Sixth Circuit in Johnson v. CommissionerG held that an encumbered
gift in trust was within the parameters of Crane. This comprehensive approach
provides an equitable and consistent method for determining the tax conseunclear to what extent
quences of encumbered gifts. Nevertheless, it remains
7
the courts have accepted the authority of Crane.
This note traces the development of the part-sale, part-gift concept as
applied to encumbered gifts. This examination includes an analysis of the
extension of Crane to the field of gifts and an evaluation of its impact on
the tax consequences of such transactions. Although the primary focus is
on gifts of property subject to indebtedness, the closely related field of "net
gifts" -property transferred subject to the donee's obligation to pay the resulting gift taxes- is also considered.
SECTION

677

Since the majority of cases involves transfers in trust, the traditional
approach to encumbered gifts is best illustrated by the application of section
677. This provision generally attributes to the grantor of a trust any trust
income that may be applied for his benefit without the consent of an adverse
party.8 If the grantor remains primarily liable for the encumbrance, the payment of the debt by the trust discharges the grantor's legal obligation and
9
the amount of the payment is taxed as ordinary income to him. Some courts,
however, have questioned the practical reality of such liability when the
1
obligation is fully secured by the transferred property. " Furthermore, the
inherent limitations of this provision are evident when the trustee formally
assumes primary liability 1 or when the property is subject to a nonrecourse
2
loan so that the grantor is not personally liable for the indebtedness.1 In
either case, the grantor has no remaining liability to which trust income
may be applied, which renders section 677 inapplicable.
The application of section 677 also depends on the realization of trust
income, without which no attribution to the grantor is possible. This feature
allows careful tax planners to avoid exposure by structuring the trust so
that the encumbrance is paid with cash generated without the realization

6. 495 F.2d 1079, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040
(1975).
7. See Edna B. Hirst, 63 T.C. 307 (1975) (on appeal to Fourth Circuit).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §677(a) provides in part: "The grantor shall be treated as
the owner of any portion of a trust . . . whose income without the approval or consent
of any adverse party is, or, in the discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party, or
both, may be - (1) distributed to the grantor or the grantor's spouse; (2) held or accumulated
for future distribution to the grantor or the grantor's spouse.
9. TREAs. RFG. §1.677 (a)-l(d).
10. Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 507, 1935-1 U.S.T.C. 9270 (2d Cir. 1935),
rev'd per curiam, 296 U.S. 552 (1935).

11. See Edwards v. Greenwald, 217 F.2d 632, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. 9114 (5th Cir. 1954).
12. But see Herbert A. Loeb, 5 T.C. 1072 (1945), aff'd, 159 F.2d 549, 1947-1 U.S.T.C.
9112 (7th Cir. 1947).
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of income. 13 Typically, the grantor's indebtedness is discharged with funds
borrowed by the trustee and secured by trust assets. The receipt of borrowed
money is not a realization event because of the concurrent liability to repay
the loan. 14 But if the indebtedness is completely discharged the grantor
retains no liability that would trigger section 677 on the subsequent realization of trust income. Application of such income to the new encumbrance
discharges only the trustee's obligation, not the grantor's. This technique was
approved in Estate of Annette S. Morgan,'5 a net gift case in which section
677 was completely avoided by allowing the trustee to pay the grantor's
gift taxes with borrowed funds rather than with trust income.
THE PART-SALE, PART-GiFT CONCEPT

As the inadequacies of section 677 have become increasingly apparent,
the Commissioner has sought to develop an alternative rationale for
determining the tax consequences of encumbered gifts. In this effort, attention
has been focused on the character of the transfer transaction.
When property is conveyed in trust for no consideration, the transaction
is treated as a gift.16 Traditionally, the grantor has realized no income from
such an event since any gain that he might have accrued from appreciation
in value was deferred by transferring his basis to the trust.' 7 When encumbered property is conveyed in trust, however, the Commissioner has
begun to assert that the discharge or assumption of the grantor's obligation
is a taxable benefit extended by the trust as consideration for receipt of
the property. Under this theory, the transaction is characterized not as a
pure gift, but as a part-sale, part-gift.' 8
As a partial sale instead of a pure gift, the transfer in trust of encumbered property is no longer considered a tax-free event. 9 The amount
of the encumbrance assumed or discharged is the amount realized in the
sale portion of the transaction. 26 From this amount, the grantor is entitled
to restore his adjusted basis as a tax-free return of capital, but any amount
13. See, e.g., Estate of Annette S. Morgan, 316 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1963), aff'g per
curiam 37 T.C. 981 (1962).
14. Cf., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. %9308
(1955); Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 1952-2 U.S.T.C. %9396 (2d Cir.
1952) (involving nonrecourse loans).
15. 37 T.C. 981 (1962), aff'd per curiam, 316 F.2d 238 (6th Cir.), cert. denied. 375 U.S.

827 (1963).
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§2511(a), 2512(b).
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1015(b).
18. See Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 9475 (N.D. Miss.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
19. TREAs. REG. §1.1001-1(e)(1) reads in pertinent part: "Where a transfer of property
is in part a sale and in part a gift, the transferor has a gain to the extent that the
amount realized by him exceeds his adjusted basis in the property. However, no loss is
......
sustained on such a transfer if the amount realized is less than tho adjusted basis
20. Gain is computed according to the general rules of §§1001(a) and (b). Such gain
is included in the grantor's gross income under the provisions of §61(a)(3), which concerns
"gains derived from dealings in property." The character of these gains is determined
under §1222 by the nature of the asset transferred and the grantor's holding period.
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realized in excess of basis is recognized as a taxable gain.2 1 If the property
transferred consists of capital assets held for more than six months, the
resulting income will be taxed as a long term capital gain.22 As before, the
grantor's basis will be transferred to the trust; however, in addition to the
normal credit to basis for gift taxes paid on the transfer, the trust is also
23
entitled to increase its basis by the amount of gain recognized by the grantor.
Although it has long been accepted that a transaction may be in part
a sale and in part a gift, 24 there has been no consensus regarding the types
of transactions that may be so characterized. 2 5 There appear to be two
approaches to this issue. The first examines the facts surrounding the disposition to determine if a portion of the transfer was actually intended to
Note that a sale or exchange is necessary for the realization of capital gains; therefore,
the characterization of the transaction as a pure gift with income arising under a debt
cancellation theory could result in the realization of ordinary income rather than capital
gains. Furthermore, the transaction is subject to recapture under §§1245 and 1250, so
ordinary income may be realized.
21. A significant feature in the computation of gain under the part-sale theory is
the allocation of the grantor's entire basis to the sale portion of the transaction. This
allows a complete recovery of basis prior to realization of gain.
Commentators have suggested that it would he appropriate to allocate the basis in
proportion to the value of the gift and sale portions of the transaction. See, e.g., Note, Bad
News for Net Givers: Donee Payment of Gift Taxes Results in Taxable Income to Donor,
36 U. PiTT. L. REv. 517, 533-35 (1976). Such an allocation is expressly provided for in
bargain sales to charitable organizations. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1011(b). This allocation
is necessary to avoid the unique results arising from the charitable deduction. Without
allocation, taxpayers were often able to receive savings from the deductions in an amount
greater than the after-tax proceeds from the sale of the property at fair market value.
To preclude this result, §1011(b), enacted in 1969, provides for the allocation of basis;
however, it is clear that these considerations are not present in the part-sale, part-gift
transfer to a noncharitable donee.
Allocation of basis is also required when only part of the asset is sold. See, e.g., Eileen
M. Hunter, 44 T.C. 109 (1965). This is necessary to avoid distortion of income on the
subsequent disposition of the retained portion of the asset. In the part-sale, part-gift
transaction, however, the entire asset is conveyed, and no portion is retained for later
disposition.
In the absence of the above considerations, a full recovery of capital is applopriate
in a part-sale, part-gift transaction. The sum of the encumbrance is the only amount
that the grantor will realize from the transferred property, and there is no compelling
reason why he should not be able to recover his full basis prior to the realization of
gain. The full appreciation of the property will be taxed on the subsequent disposition
by the donee so the tax is deferred, not avoided.
22. But see TREAS. REG. §1.1245-4(a)(3) (concerning potential recapture).
23. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§1015(a), (b), and (d); TREAS. REG. §§1.1015-2 and 4:
Citizen's Nat'l Bank v. United States, 417 F.2d 675, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. ]9655 (5th Cir. 1969)
(TREAs. REG. §1015-4 held invalid to the extent that it provided a cost basis rather
than transferred basis, which precluded the tacking of grantor's holding period). See also
Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. %9355, at 83,819 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1975). TREAs. REG. §1.105-2 was suggested as the appropriate
regulation controlling basis computation for part-sale, part-gift transfers in trust. Id. at
1085 n.12, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,821 n.12.
24. See Reginald Fincke, 39 B.T.A. 510 (1939), acquiesced in, 1939-2 Cus. BULL. 12;
Harry F. Robertson, 5 B.T.A. 748 (1926).
25. See, e.g., Edna B. Hirst, 63 T.C. 307 (1975) (on appeal to Fourth Circuit).
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be a sale.26 If so, the event is characterized as a partial sale and the benefit
accruing to the grantor is realized and taxed accordingly. However, if it
is found that only a gift was intended, the transfer is treated as such, and
any benefits accruing to the grantor remain unrealized.
A second approach, which the Commissioner has recently taken, examines
the facts to determine if the grantor has realized an economic benefit from
the transfer; if so, the transaction is characterized as a partial sale. 27 Thus,
if the grantor's obligations are assumed or discharged, he will be deemed to
have realized a taxable benefit, and the transaction will be treated as a
part-sale, part-gift. Under this approach, the intent of the grantor in making
the transfer is immaterial, and the effect of the transfer on the grantor determines its characterization.
The results of the Commissioner's more recent approach are determined
by the identification of the taxable benefits realized by the grantor in the
transfer transaction. Since the essential benefit will be the relief from the
legal obligation of the encumbrance, this approach highlights the troublesome
issue of the assumption of liability. If the trust formally assumes a personal
obligation, the benefit to the grantor is reasonably clear. 28 The issue is inevitably complicated, however, by the transfer of property subject to nonrecourse encumbrances in which the grantor has no personal liability. In
this context, the Commissioner has applied the Crane doctrine and asserted
broadly that the amount of the encumbrance is always realized by the
grantor on transfer, regardless of whether he is personally libel for the indebtedness or whether such liability is formally assumed by the trust. 29 This
approach provides a comprehensive method of determining the tax consequences of gratuitously transferring encumbered property.
The Commissioner, however, has been somewhat reluctant to adopt the
part-sale, part-gift approach exclusively, perhaps because it generally results
in the realization of long term capital gain rather than ordinary income
as under section 677.30 Nevertheless, if the transfer in trust is within the
parameters of Crane, the subsequent application of section 677 should be
precluded. The rationale of Crane mandates a realization of the indebtedness
that doses the transaction as to the grantor, and any gain will be recognized
only at the time of transfer. The amount of the encumbrance cannot be
realized again in the subsequent operation of the trust. Thus, while the
Crane doctrine provides an effective alternative when section 677 is avoided,
it also provides an equally effective defense when section 677 would otherwise apply. The following discussion traces the case law development of the
part-sale, part-gift concept and examines the two general approaches described
26. See, e.g., Richard H. Turner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968).
27. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1975).
28. See, e.g., Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 422, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 9475 (N.D.
Miss. 1971), afJ'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
29. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1975).
30. See, e.g., Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), afj'd per curiam, 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir.
1974), acquiesced in, 1973-2 Cums. BULL. 4.
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above. The discussion of the second approach considers the applicability of
the Crane doctrine and its impact on the current status of the part-sale
concept.
CHARACTERIZATION OF TRANSACTIONS AS

PARTIAL SALES - BASED ON INTENT

The part-sale, part-gift concept was initially developed in the general
field of encumbered gifts. Early cases involved blatant attempts to avoid
taxation by structuring sale transactions in the form of nontaxable dispositions.31 Typically, a taxpayer would encumber property immediately
prior to a gratuitous transfer. The donee would assume the indebtedness
and subsequently discharge the obligation. To avoid taxation, the donor
would assert that neither the receipt of borrowed money nor the gift of
property was a taxable event and that no income was realized on the
transactions. 3 2 Nevertheless, the donor would retain the proceeds of the loan
without liability for the debt, which placed him in the same position as if
he had sold the property for cash that the donee had borrowed. Under these
circumstances, courts were correctly impressed with the fact that the taxpayer was actually trying to disguise the sale of property, and thus the
early applications of the part-sale, part-gift concept naturally emphasized
the transferor's intent.33
Step and Sham Transactions
In the initial cases involving encumbered gifts, the courts relied primarily
on the step transaction and sham doctrines to justify the characterization
of transfers as partial sales. In Magnolia Development Corp.34 a corporate
taxpayer owned stock with a fair market value of $42,500 and a basis of
$10,444. With a willing purchaser standing by, the taxpayer encumbered
the stock for the amount of $42,000 and conveyed it to a university. Immediately thereafter, the university sold the stock to the waiting buyer, repaid
the loan, and retained the balance of $500. The Tax Court had little trouble
applying the sham doctrine and held the substance of the transaction to be
"a sale of the stock for a price $500 less than its fair market value of $42,500,
which made the selling price $42,000, with a gift of the balance.
...
5
Accordingly, the taxpayer realized long term capital gain in the amount by
which the encumbrance exceeded his basis.
In Simon v. Commissioner,36 the taxpayer sought to make a capital
contribution to a corporation in which he owned a controlling interest. The
parties involved agreed on a plan whereby improved realty was to be con31. See Simon v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 422, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. 9136 (3d Cir. 1961);
Magnolia Dev. Corp., 1960 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1160, 77 (1960).
32. Cf. Magnolia Dev. Corp., 1960 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 60,177, at 1035 (1960).
33. Id. at 1036.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1035.
36. 285 F.2d 422, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. 9136 (3d Cir. 1961).
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veyed to the corporation. Apparently unwilling to contribute the entire
value of the property, the taxpayer provided in the plan for the encumbrance of the assets prior to transfer.3 Accordingly, the taxpayer borrowed
$120,000 without personal liability and conveyed the property to the corporation subject to this indebtedness. The Third Circuit, emphasizing the close
time intervals between the transactions, found that the events were steps
in a "single integrated transaction and constituted a sale."38 The characterization of the transaction as a partial sale rested on the court's ultimate finding
of fact that a sale had actually been intended.39 The court held that taxable
gain was realized on the transfer in the amount that the loan exceeded the
taxpayer's basis.
Although the above decisions dearly reached the correct result, the outcome of similar litigation was unpredictable because of the courts' reliance
on the intent of the transferor. The disadvantages of such a subjective
criterion became painfully apparent as the concept was asserted in different
contexts.
Net Gift Transactions
The first application of the part-sale, part-gift concept to a transfer in
trust involved a net gift, an event closely related to a gift of encumbered
property. In a net gift transaction, property is donated to a trust or to an
individual on the condition that the donee pay the resulting gift taxes.
The Commissioner has conceded that the donor should be liable for gift
tax only on the net amount, that is, the gross value of the property
transferred less the amount of gift taxes paid.O The rationale is that by
conditioning the gift on the payment of the tax, the donor actually intended
a gift of only the net amount.4 1
For income tax purposes, however, the Commissioner has made no such
concessions. Since the donor is statutorily liable for his own gift taxes,42 the
economic benefit derived from their payment by the donee is obvious. In
net gifts to trusts, the Commissioner has successfully attributed to the grantor
income applied by the trustee toward these taxes since the grantor had
either retained an income interest in the trust4 3 or received constructive
distributions for his benefit within the meaning of section 677.4
37. Id. at 424, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. at 79,218.
38. Id. at 425, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. at 79,218.
39. Id. at 423-24, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. at 79,217.
40. Rev. Rul. 71-232, 1971-1 Cum. BulL. 275. The Commissioner therein provided
an algebraic formula for computing the interdependent value of the tax that must be
subtracted from the gross value of the gift to arrive at the net amount on which
gift tax must be paid.
41. See Sarah H. Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), acquiesced in, 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 2;
Pamela Lingo, 1954 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 54,145 (1954).
42.

INT. R v. CODE OF 1954,

43. See, e.g., Estate of
U.S.T.C. %9487 (5th Cir.),
44. See, e.g., Estate of
U.S.T.C. 19272 (8th Cir.),

12502(d);

TREAS. REG.

125.2502-2.

A.E. Staley, Sr., 47 B.T.A. 260 (1942), aff'd, 136 F.2d 368, 1943-1
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943).
Craig R. Shaeffer, 37 T.C. 99 (1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d 738, 1963-1
cert. denied, 375 .U.S. 818 (1963).
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Ironically, the part-sale, part-gift concept in the net gift context was first
asserted by a grantor. In Estate of A.E. Staley, Sr.,45 the taxpayer established
five separate inter vivos trusts for the benefit of his children. To raise money
to pay the resulting gift taxes, the grantor directed each trustee to pay
him $30,000 from trust income as consideration for the stock. Apparently
this amount did not exceed the grantor's basis. Therefore, he asserted that the
entire amount was a tax-free return of capital received in a partial sale.46
The Board of Tax Appeals, however, held that the total of $150,000 received
from the five trusts was taxable to the grantor as ordinary income.4- The
Board concluded that:
The treatment of the money received by [the grantor] as a return
of capital for the sale of securities seems to us entirely artificial.
Petitioner was making a gift of property to his children. He was not
selling them shares of stock. One does not sell over $2,000,000 worth

of shares for $150,000. It is equally artificial to treat the transactions
as in part a sale and in part a gift. The property transferred was shares
of stock and if it had been [the grantor's] intention to sell some of
those shares he could have easily designated the ones he intended to
sell as distinct from those that he was giving away. .

.

. Nothing

more nor less than gifts of the shares was involved and the $150,000
48
was received by [the grantor] as income rather than return of capital.
Without relying on section 677, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the holding and
characterized the transaction as "an outright transfer for no consideration,
but with a reservation to the donor of a portion of the income." 49
In later trust cases the Commissioner successfully applied section 677 by
characterizing the gift tax payments as distributions for the benefit of the
grantor in discharge of his legal obligations.50 However, with the growing
popularity of the plan recognized in Estate of Annette S. Morgan,5s tax
exposure under section 677 could be avoided easily by paying the gift taxes
with borrowed money instead of trust income. 52
In instances in which section 677 had been successfully circumvented,
the Commissioner reversed his stand taken originally in Estate of A.E. Staley
and asserted that the net gift transaction was in substance a partial sale. In
Richard H. Turner5 3 the donor-taxpayer made several net gifts of highly
45. 47 B.T.A. 260 (1942), aff'd, 136 F.2d 368, 1943-1 U.S.T.C.
46. Id. at 264.
47. Id. at 265.

9487 (5th Cir. 1943).

48. Id.
49. Estate of A.E. Staley, Sr., 136 F.2d 368, 1943-1 U.S.T.C. 9487 (1943).
50. See Estate of Craig R. Shaeffer, 37 T.C. 99 (1961), afl'd, 313 F.2d 738, 1963-1 U.S.T.C.
9272 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963); Rev. Rul. 57-564, 1957-2 Gum. BULL. 328.
51. 37 T.C. 981 (1962), aff'd, 316 F.2d 238, 1963-1 U.S.T.C. 9401 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 825 (1963).
52. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra. See Lowenstein, Federal Tax Implications
of Gifts Net of Gift Tax. 50 TAXEs 525 (1972); Reif, Donee-Paid Gift Tax: Some Considerations, 58 A.B.A.J. 1325 (1972); Schreibman, Structuring a Net Gift That Will Stand Up:
How To Satisfy the IRS and the Courts, 39 J. TAx. 6 (1973).

53.

49 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d 752, 1969-1 U.S.T.C.
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appreciated stock to both individuals and trusts. The individual donees
accepted the personal obligation to pay the resulting gift taxes, while the
trustees agreed to pay the taxes from trust corpus. Obviously, the gifts to
individuals did not come within the purview of section 677," and the trustees
avoided exposure by paying the taxes from corpus rather than income. The
Commissioner, therefore, sought to characterize the transfers to the individual
donees as partial sales and to tax the donor on the excess of the amount
of the gift tax over his basis. 55 Because the trustees had not personally assumed
the liability for the taxes, the Commissioner conceded that there was no
effective exchange of consideration between the grantor and the trustees;
therefore, the transfers in trust were not considered partial sales.58 But since
the grantor accepted the personal promises of the individual donees in exchange for the gifts, the Commissioner asserted that a taxable benefit in the
s7
amount of the gift tax had been realized in a partial sale.
The court disregarded the Commissioner's theory concerning the actual
benefit received by the taxpayer and looked instead to the intent of the
donor in making the transfers. 58 In reviewing the previous cases including
Estate of A.E. Staley, the court noted that "the major premise of each decision
is that a condition imposed by the transferor that the transferee will pay
the gift tax resulting therefrom does not alter the result that the transfer
constituted a gift." 59 On the basis of the facts presented, the court concluded: "We think it clear that what was intended by [the donor] was a net
gift, the value of the shares less the value of the gift tax payable on the
transfers."6 0 Accordingly, the court refused to characterize the transfer as a
partial sale, and the benefit of the relief from gift taxes remained unrealized. 61

54. Presumably the Commissioner could have argued, as in Estate of A.E. Staley, Sr.,
that the grantor had retained an income interest in the transferred property. The grantor
would then be taxed to the extent of the gift tax on the dividends from the stock
as they were distributed.
55. Richard H. Turner, 49 T.C. 856, 362-63 (1968), arid per curiam, 410 F.2d 752
(6th Cir. 1969).
56.

Id.

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 362.

60. Id. at 863.
61. The court in Turner was also concerned with the computation of the donee's basis
under the part-sale, part-gift approach. In accordance with TREAs.

RaE.

§1.105-4, the gift

taxes are the amount paid for the stock. Thus, in computing the basis under that
regulation, the donee appears to receive a double credit for the gift taxes paid. The

amount of tax is first included as a cost basis for the transferred property. This figure
is then increased by the same amount in accordance with the normal gift tax credit.
The court, however, failed to realize that the donee's cost basis is actually the grantor's
basis increased by the gain recognized by the transfer. The confusion results from the
terminology used in §1.1015-4. The correct computation would start with the transferred
basis; this amount then is increased by both the gain recognized and the gift taxes
paid. The appropriateness of the adjustments is clear. The donee should not be taxed on

the gain already recognized by the grantor, thus the increase in the donee's basis for
the grantor's gain.
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The reasoning in Turner was followed in several subsequent decisions
that similarly rejected the part-sale theory in the context of net gifts. 6 2 These
decisions were clearly a setback in the development of the part-sale, part-gift
concept. It seems that the net gift transactions were particularly ill-suited
for the application of the partial sale theory asserted by the Commissioner.
The grantor's donative intent in such transactions is obvious, and the benefits
received are not blatantly tangible. The economic realities of transferring
encumbered property in trust are more clearly presented in instances in which
property is conveyed subject to preexisting indebtedness rather than gift tax
obligations. As in the early step and sham transactions, 63 the realization of
income is undeniable when the donor receives the proceeds of a loan and
immediately transfers the property to a donee who either assumes or discharges the indebtedness. In those transactions, the realization of the loan
proceeds is justified on the finding that the transfer is actually a sale. 64 The
fact that the encumbrance is incurred immediately before the transfer is
indicative of the intent to sell.6 5 But even if the loan proceeds are received
at a time further removed from the transfer, the benefit is not extinguished.
While the intent to sell may be less apparent, the economic benefit is
evidenced by the funds retained with no obligation of repayment. To be
taxed, however, there must be a justification for the realization of this
benefit; if the facts preclude a finding that the event is actually a sale, then
an alternative approach is required. Commentators have noted66 the Commissioner's failure to assert as an alternative the broader principles underlying the transfer of encumbered property and have criticized his neglect
of the strongest authority in support of the part-sale, part-gift conceptCrane v. Commissioner.67
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF TRANSACTIONS AS PARTIAL
SALES -

BASED ON REALIZED BENEFIT

The part-sale, part-gift approach ultimately adopted by the Commissioner
6
takes a broader view of the realization of income. In Helvering v. Bruun, 8
the Supreme Court stated:
While ...

economic gain is not always taxable as income . . . realiza-

tion of gain need not be in cash derived from the sale of an asset.
Gain may occur as a result of exchange of property, payment of a

62.

See Victor W. Krause, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971); Estate of Kenneth W. Davis, 30 CCH

Tax Ct. Mem. 31,120 (1971), al'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972).
63. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
64. See Simon v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 422, 1961-1 U.S.T.C.
9136 (3d Cir. 1961);
Magnolia Dev. Corp., 1960 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. f60,177 (1960).
65. Simon v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 422, 425, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. 9136, at 79,218 (3d
Cir. 1961).
ON

66. See Berl, Disposition of Property Mortgaged in Excess of Basis, N.Y.U.
ED. TAX. 1033, 1042-45; Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 526-27.
67. 331 U.S. 1, 1947-1 U.S.T.C. 9217 (1947).

68.

19TH INST.

309 U.S. 461, 1940-1 U.S.T.C. 9337 (1940).
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taxpayer's indebtedness, relief from a liability, or other profit realized

from the completion of a transaction. 69

Under this rationale, the finding of an intended sale is not a prerequisite
to the realization of income. Instead, the critical factor is the receipt of
economic gain or benefit. In the transfer of encumbered property, this
benefit is generally the "relief from a liability" or the "payment of a
taxpayer's indebtedness."70 If the grantor is personally liable for an encumbrance that is either assumed or discharged, the benefit is well established
under notions of Old Colony Trust.7 ' The Commissioner, however, has
broadly asserted that the rationale of Crane justifies the realization of indebtedness even if the grantor is not personally obligated on the encumbrance7 2
In Crane v.Commissioner,73 the Supreme Court established the fundamental principle that on the sale of encumbered property the sum of the
encumbrance is included in the amount realized, regardless of whether the
seller is personally liable for the indebtedness or whether the buyer formally
assumes such liability. Crane involved a taxpayer who inherited an apartment house subject to an unassumed mortgage. The property was appraised
for estate tax purposes at exactly the amount of the mortgage, $262,042.
For seven years the apartment was operated at a loss while the taxpayer
took substantial deductions for depreciation.74 Payments on the mortgage
failed to cover the interest charges and the principal remained at the
original amount. With the mortgagee threatening foreclosure, the property
was sold subject to the mortgage for $2,500 net cash. The taxpayer reported
a gain of $2,500, reasoning that the basis of the inheritance was her equity
interest ($-0-), and that the amount realized on the sale was the net cash
received ($2,500).75 The Supreme Court, however, found the, basis to be
the fair market value of the land and building, not the equity interest in
such property. 76 Accordingly, the original basis of the inheritance was set
at its appraised value ($262,042) and appropriately depreciated to reach the
adjusted basis at the time of sale. Thereafter, the Court included the mortgage
in the amount realized in order to avoid the absurd result of finding that
property worth roughly $250,000 had been sold for only $2,500.
The taxpayer conceded that the assumption of a personal obligation
would have been a benefit includable in the amount realized 77 She con69. Id. at 469, 1940-1 U.S.T.C. at 9873 (emphasis added).

70. Id.
71.

279 U.S. 716, 1 U.S.T.C.

408 (1929) (Court held that an employer's payment of

an employee's taxes was income to the employee in the amount of the taxes paid).
72. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1975); Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 422, 1971-1
U.S.T.C. 9475 (N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
73. 331 U.S. 1, 1947-1 U.S.T.C. 9217 (1947).
74. Id. at 3 n.2, 1947-1 U.S.T.C. at 12,427 n.2.
75. Id. at 3, 4, 1947-1 U.S.T.C. at 12,427.
76. Id. at 6-11, 1947-1 U.S.T.C. at 12,428-30.
77. Id. at 13, 1947-1 U.S.T.C. at 12,431.
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tended, however, that since she was not personally liable on the mortgage,
there was no benefit in the form of an assumed or discharged obligation.
In its response, the Court concentrated on the critical issue of assumption
of liability and stated:
M

[A]n owner of property, mortgaged at a figure less than that at which the
property will sell, must and will treat the conditions of the mortgage
exactly as if they were his personal obligations. If he transfers subject
to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial as if
the mortgage were discharged, or as if7 9 a personal debt in an equal
amount had been assumed by another.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer had realized the
amount of the principal of the mortgage, despite the absence of personal
liability.
Because Crane was decided in the context of a sale transaction, its
principles have not been readily applied to gratuitous transfers. Commentators disagree on the scope of Crane,80 and when other rationales have been
available, courts have avoided ruling directly on Crane's applicability to
encumbered gifts. 81 The following analysis, however, indicates that a grantor
receives an economic benefit on the transfer of property encumbered in
excess of basis, even when he is not personally liable for the indebtedness.
To appropriately tax this benefit, it is necessary to extend the principles of
Crane to encompass gifts subject to indebtedness.
If the grantor encumbers the property prior to the transfer in trust, he
receives not only the intangible advantage of appreciation in value but also
the tangible benefit of the loan proceeds. Obviously, the grantor will receive
these funds whether he becomes personally responsible for the indebtedness
or whether the loan is secured solely by the value of the property. In either
case, such funds will not constitute gross income on receipt because the
transaction is kept open by the obligation to repay the loan.8 2 But if property
subject to a nonrecourse debt is transferred, the grantor is left with the proceeds and no further obligation to repay the loan. It is the trustee who must
pay the amount due or surrender the property. At this point, the transaction
78. Id.
79. Id. at 14, 1947-1 U.S.T.C. at 12,431.
80. See Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An Imaginery
Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAx L. REV. 159, 166-70 (1968); Bacas, Gifts of Property Subject
to Indebtedness: Johnson v. Commissioner, 44 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 86 (1975); Berl, supra
note 66, at 1033; Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of
Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 PENN. L. REV. 69 (1969). But see Spears.
Mortgages in Excess of Basis, 1959 S. CAL. TAX INST. 883 (1959).
81. See, e.g., Simon v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 422, 425, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. %9136, at
79,219 (3d Cir. 1961); Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106, 113, 1971-1 U.S.T.C.
%9475, at 686, 699-700 (N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
82. When the money is borrowed without personal liability but solely on the security
of the property, the debtor still realizes no income since as the owner of the collateral
he is under an implied obligation to repay the loan. As owner of the property he is
also the owner of the debt. Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 1952-2
U.S.T.C. 19396 (2d Cir. 1952).
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is dosed as to the grantor, and he should be taxed on the pecuniary benefits
83
received.
Even if the grantor remains legally liable on the debt, there may be, in
substance, an assumption of liability sufficient to close the transaction for
income tax purposes. If the property is worth as much or more than the
amount of the encumbrance, then the trustee is under the same economic
compulsion to pay the debt as the owner of the apartment house in Crane.
To this extent, the trustee has in reality assumed the indebtedness, and the
84
grantor has realized the benefit of relief from liability.
Taxable benefits may also accrue when depreciable property is acquired
subject to an encumbrance. According to Crane, the amount of the debt will
be included in the grantor's basis, regardless of whether liability for the
encumbrance has been assumed. Thus, he will have the benefit of the resulting depreciation deductions during the period of his ownership. If these
deductions reduce the basis to an amount less than the encumbrance, then
the grantor will have received the benefit of depreciation on that portion
of the property financed by the loan. While somewhat more attenuated
than the direct receipt of loan proceeds, these deductions are no less an
economic benefit arising from the encumbrance. When the indebtedness is
transferred with the property, the transaction is again dosed with respect to
the grantor, and again he has realized a taxable benefit to the extent that
these deductions reduced the basis below the amount of encumbering debts.85
Commentators have also questioned the rationale for distinguishing between sales and gifts, particularly in instances in which the consideration
is minimal.8 8 For example, in Crane the cash payment was only one percent
of the value of the property. The Supreme Court relied on this boot to
insure that the property was worth more than the encumbrance, a necessary
prerequisite to the owner's economic compulsion to pay the indebtedness.
However, the absence of boot in the gift transaction does not indicate that
the value of the property is less than the encumbrance. If this were true,
there would be no gift since the gift element is the excess of the property's
fair market value over the indebtedness.87 Thus, a donee of encumbered
property is under the same economic compulsion as the buyer in Crane.
Likewise, the express or implied assumption of the indebtedness is consideration paid for the property whether accompanied by boot or not. The transaction in Crane would have been no less a sale in the absence of a nominal
cash payment because the significant consideration was the implied assumption of the mortgage. It is this implied assumption of liability that operates
as consideration to make the gift of encumbered property a partial sale.

83. Adams, supra note 80, at 174 n.23.
84. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
85.
Adams,
86.
87.

See Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 459 (lst Cir. 1950) (Magruder, J., concurring);
supranote 80, at 169-70.
Berl, supra note 65, at 1044.
Bacas, supranote 80, at 99.
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Benefit Realized From FormalAssumption of Liability
The Commissioner's new approach under Crane was first asserted in
Malone v. Commissioner."" The facts of the case revealed the absence of
a step or sham transaction, and half of the encumbering debt was incurred
several years prior to the transfer in trust. Therefore, the reasoning in Simon
and Magnolia Development Corp.8 9 did not appear determinative, and commentators anticipated the resolution of the Crane controversy. 90 Although the
court ultimately found the transfer to be a part-sale, part-gift, it based its
conclusion not on the Crane doctrine but on the formal assumption of liability
by the trustee.
In Malone, a taxpayer owned farmland that was purchased for $13,650
in 1940. At the time of the transfer, the property had appreciated in value
to $57,485, but there was a personal mortgage encumbering the property
for $16,000. Three months prior to the transfer, the taxpayer personally
borrowed an additional $16,000 on the property in order to finance his
farming operations on other lands. Thereafter, the land was conveyed to
an irrevocable trust for the benefit of the taxpayer's children. While not
expressly providing for the assumption of liability, the trust instrument
directed the trustees to pay the subsequent mortgage installments with trust
income. The taxpayer claimed the conveyance was wholly a gift that resulted
in neither pecuniary benefit nor taxable gain.9' Asserting the applicability
of Crane, the Commissioner contended that the transaction was in part a
sale and in part a gift, resulting in gain to the extent that the mortgages
92
exceeded the grantor's basis.
The court held for the Commissioner but did not rule on the applicability
of Crane. The court found instead that the terms of the trust were sufficient
to constitute a formal assumption of liability under state law and that relief
from this obligation was a pecuniary benefit extended to the grantor as
consideration for the property. 9' Thus, the amount of the mortgage was
realized in a partial sale, and the excess of the mortgage over the basis was
recognized as gain.
The holding in Malone is significant in that the court looked to the
benefit realized by the grantor rather than to the grantor's intent in making
the transfer. It would be clearly unrealistic to claim that the transfer was
intended as an actual sale and that the encumbrances were part of a
sham scheme to avoid taxation. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the
grantor did receive an economic benefit from the events. Unlike the net
gift cases, the court in Malone correctly recognized that it was the realiza88. 526 F. Supp. 106, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. %9475 (N.D. Miss. 1971), afJd per curiam, 455
F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
89. See text accompanying notes 34-59 supra.
90. See Bluhm, Tax Considerations in Financing Real Estate Transactions, 47 TAXEs
844, 849 (1969).
91. Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106, 109, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 9475, at 86,697
(N.D. Miss. 1971). aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
92. Id. at 110, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at 86,697.
93. Id. at 111, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at 86,698.
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tion of this benefit that made the transaction a partial sale regardless of
what the grantor intended.
The court's avoidance of the principles of Crane indicated a reluctance
to confront the economic realities of transactions involving encumbered
property. The court expressed reservations regarding the applicability of
the Crane doctrine as asserted by the Commissioner, and narrowly limited
their reasoning to instances in which: (1) the grantor is personally liable
prior to the transfer; (2) the loan proceeds are used for the grantor's own
purposes; and (3) the primary liability is then placed on the trust.9 4 This
reliance on the formalistic assumption of liability results in many of the
same inconsistencies that are evident under section 677. 95 In fact, if
Mississippi law had not provided for an assumption of liability on the
Malone facts, the Commissioner apparently would have been forced to rely
on section 677 to attribute the grantor with any trust income applied toward
the mortgages.9 6 In such an eventuality, the grantor could apparently avoid
taxation by allowing the trustee to use borrowed funds to discharge the
encumbrance. 97 Furthermore, taxpayers sophisticated enough to avoid personal
liability by negotiating nonrecourse loans could still escape taxation in all
but the most blatant sham transactions.
Benefit Realized Under the Crane Doctrine
The fallacies of the formalistic view of assumption were clearly demonstrated in Johnson v. Commissioner,98 in which the court faced a situation
involving the primary defect in the reasoning of Malone: the nonrecourse
encumbrance. Furthermore, the unique facts of Johnson raised the issue of
the applicability of Crane to both encumbered gifts and net gifts and pre94. Id. at 113, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at 86,700.
95. See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
96. The Malone approach highlights the same critical issue that controlled the application of §677-assumption of liability. Under §677, the issue of assumption determined
whether the grantor was still liable on the indebtedness after the transfer, and whether
he received a taxable benefit on its discharge. Under the part-sale, part-gift concept.
the issue of assumption determines whether there has been an exchange of consideration
and whether the grantor realizes the amount of the indebtedness in a partial sale. This
controversy, like the application of §677, involves the dichotomy between the formalistic
assumption based on local law and the implied assumption based on the economic realities
of the transfer. Compare Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106, 1971-1 U.S.T.C.
19475 (N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972) with Lucy A.
Blumenthal, 30 B.T.A. 591 (1934), ret'd, 76 F.2d 507, 1935-1 U.S.T.C. 9270 (2d Cir.
1935), reinstated per curiam, 296 U.S. 552 (1935), and Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d
1079, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (6th Cir. 1974) with Herff v. Rountree, 140 F. Supp. 201,
1956-1 U.S.T.C. 9359 (M.D. Tenn. 1956).
97. Arguably, the discharge of the encumbering mortgages with borrowed money
would result in taxable income to the grantor under an expansive view of Old Colony
Trust. This theory would not be an application of §677 but would be based entirely on
the benefit received by the grantor, that is, the discharge of the mortgage Would be
income to the mortgagor regardless of who discharged the debt or with what funds.
98. 495 F.2d 1079, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040

(1975).
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sented the Sixth Circuit with an excellent opportunity to reevaluate the tax
consequences of consequences of those two related events.
In Johnson each of three brothers wished to establish a trust for the
benefit of his children with stock from a family owned corporation. Typical
of the three, one taxpayer decided to transfer in trust 50,000 shares of
stock valued at $500,000 with a basis of $10,000. Initially, the total state and
federal gift taxes were estimated at $208,497. 99 Instead of requiring the
trustee to pay these taxes, the grantor planned to discharge the obligations
himself. To raise the necessary funds prior to the transfer, he executed a
note for $200,000 solely on the security of the stock and with no personal
liability. Two days later he conveyed the stock in trust subject to the indebtedness. Shortly thereafter, the trustees cancelled the grantor's note with
a second note of their own that also was secured by the stock. Meanwhile,
the original gift tax estimate had proven erroneous, and the actual taxes
amounted to only $150,000. Thus, after paying all obligations, the grantor
was left with an obvious cash bailout of $50,000. The Commissioner asserted
that long term capital gain was realized in the amount that the encumbrance
exceeded the grantor's basis10 ($200,000 less $10,000 or gain of $190,000).
The taxpayer argued that the transaction was a net gift and that under
Turner no income was realized.101
The Tax Court, relying on Crane, found that the transaction was a partial
sale rather than a net gift and that the sum of the loan was the amount
realized on the transfer. However, in reaching this conclusion, Turner was
carefully distinguished by noting that the Johnson gifts were not conditioned
on the donee's payment of the gift taxes and that the amount of the loan
was greater than the gift tax liability? °2 The Tax Court thus preserved
the net gift concept of Turner and its progeny.
On appeal, the taxpayers conceded that Crane controlled the excess
$50,000 but reasserted their argument that the remaining $150,000 was a net
03
gift indistinguishable from Turner.1
The Sixth Circuit was unconvinced by
the Tax Court's distinctions and found only one real difference between
Turner and Johnson: in Turner the tax counsel advised the grantor to pay
the gift taxes with funds borrowed by the trustee after the transfer, whereas
in Johnson the taxpayer was advised to borrow the funds himself prior to
the gift. In either case, the trust bore the ultimate burden of paying the
taxes. The Sixth Circuit did not feel that completely divergent results
should arise from such minor distinctions in tax planning.14 But instead
of following their previous decision in Turner, the court severely limited
Turner to its facts and characterized the substance of the Johnson transaction
not as a net gift but as a "gift of $500,000 worth of stock in exchange for
99.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1082 n.6, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,819 n.6.

Id. at 1081, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,818.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1802, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,818-19.
Id.
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10 5
- $150,000 of which was used to pay the donor's gift tax."'
The
"part sale, part gift" and "net gift" labels were considered immaterial. 06 The
Sixth Circuit was impressed by the fact that "the taxpayer received $200,000
free and clear of any obligation to repay that amount from any property in
his possession."' 107 This was found to be gross income within the meaning of
section 61.108 Moreover, the court found that the same result could be reached
if the $150,000 were characterized as a payment of the donor's gift taxes
since this would result in a constructive receipt of income in the form of a
discharged legal obligation under the rationale of Old Colony Trust. 0 9 The
most significant aspect of the decision, however, was the Sixth Circuit's finding
that "the transactions in this case fall within the parameters of Crane....
On the above reasoning, the Sixth Circuit held that the taxpayer realized
the amount of the encumbrance and recognized capital gains to the extent
by which this amount exceeded the basis.

$200,000

CURRENT STATUS OF THE PART-SALE,
PART-GIFT CONCEPT

The decision in Johnson v. Commissioner represents the latest refinements
in the part-sale, part-gift concept as applied to gifts of encumbered property.
The decision reaffirms the liberal view adopted in Malone that economic gain
may be realized in the absence of a traditional sale. Thus, it no longer
should be necessary to establish that the grantor actually intended to sell
the property. Instead, the characterization of the transfer as a partial sale
should depend on the receipt of an economic benefit. In the determination
of this benefit, Johnson goes far beyond the formalistic approach of Malone.
Instead of requiring a technical assumption of legal liability, the Sixth Circuit applied the Crane doctrine and found that economic benefit is realized
106. Id. at 1083, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,819. While the Sixth Circuit refused to label
the transaction a part-sale, part-gift, in essence they characterized the transfer as a
part-exchange. In any event, the tax consequences are identical with those under the
part-sale characterization. Apparently the court merely was trying to avoid the conflict
of semantics surrounding the net gift cases.
107. Id.
108. This reasoning reflects the theory that the nonrecourse loan transaction is closed
on the transfer of the property. See text accompanying note 83 supra. Thus, on disposition
of the property there remains no obligation to counterbalance the increase in net worth
represented by the proceeds of the loan. Accordingly, the amount of the proceeds is
realized on the transfer.
109. Apparently the court here takes an expansive view of Old Colony Trust and
does not limit the application of that principle to the confines of §677. That is, the
assumption and discharge of the gift tax obligation is a realization of income to the
grantor regardless of whether the source of the funds or the transaction involved is
loaned money or trust income. Note, however, that in order for this income to accrue
at the time of the transfer it is necessary to find an assumption of the obligation. The
subsequent discharge of the obligation standing alone would appear to create income
unrelated to the transfer and thus would not be considered an amount realized in a
partial sale. The result would be ordinary income without the benefit of capital gains
treatment or the restoration of basis.
110. 495 F.2d at 1083, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,820.
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on the transfer of encumbered property regardless of the grantor's liability
for the indebtedness or the trustee's formal assumption of the obligation.
Despite the holding of Johnson, the judicial acceptance of the Commissioner's broad version of the part-sale, part-gift concept is uncertain in view
of the recent decision in Edna B. Hirst."' In that case the Tax Court faced
the classic net gift transaction and felt compelled to follow the precedent
of Turner despite Johnson. The facts involved an elderly widow who gave
several parcels of land to her son and grandchildren. The property was
conveyed directly to the individuals, except in the instance of one minor
grandchild in which the transfer was made in trust. All of the gifts were
conditioned on the son's payment of the resulting gift taxes. The Tax
Court admitted the pursuasiveness of the Commissioner's more "realistic"
approach and noted that. the court in Johnson had obviously disapproved
of the reasoning in Turner.1 1 2 However, it was also noted that Turner had
not been overruled but merely limited to its facts. Furthermore, since the
Commissioner's concessions in Turner concerned only gifts to trusts, it was
reasoned that its precedential value regarding gifts to individuals remained
undiminished. 1 3 Thus, the Tax Court followed Turner and refused to tax
the donor on the excess of the gift taxes over her basis in the transferred
property.
The holding in Hirst results from the failure to recognize the recent
developments in the part-sale, part-gift concept. The underpinning of Turner
is that the donor of a net gift intends only a gift, not a sale. However, as
recognized in both Malone and Johnson, a sale is not a prerequisite to
realization of income. 1 1 4 Clearly, in a net gift transaction the donor receives
the benefit of relief from the obligation to pay gift taxes. Even under the
traditional notions of Old Colony Trust, this is an economic benefit realized
by the donor.1 5 Furthermore, the Tax Court in Hirst neglected the most
limiting factor of Turner; the Commissioner's failure to assert Crane. Surprisingly, the Hirst opinion does not even mention Crane; presumably, the
Commissioner will more forcefully assert the doctrine on appeal. The realization of the gift taxes is the unavoidable result of applying Crane. Thus,
barring a conflicting holding that the doctrine is inapplicable to net gifts, a
reversal appears inevitable.
A decision in conflict with Johnson may force the Supreme Court to
clarify the scope of Crane, but the appropriate outcome appears to be a
foregone conclusion. The lower court decisions point to the growing consensus that the transfer of property encumbered in excess of basis triggers
the recognition of gain.116 Furthermore, this conclusion has been incorporated
111.

63. T.C. 307 (1975) (on appeal to Fourth Circuit).

112. Id. at 314-15.
118. Id.
114. See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 1940-1 U.S.T.C. 9337 (1940). See text
accompanying note 69 supra.
115. Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9355, at 83,820
(6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1975).
116. Id.; First Nat'l Indus. v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 1182, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. 9145
(6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1014 (1970); Simon v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 422,
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into both the Code and Regulations in several analogous situations. For
example, section 357(c) requires the recognition of gain to the extent that
an encumbrance basis when property is transferred to a controlled corporation pursuant to section 351. Like Crane, this provision applies whether
liability is assumed or merely transferred subject to the property. 117 Similarly,
Regulation secti6n 1.1011-2(a)(3) provides that the amount of indebtedness
encumbering property donated to a charitable organization is realized on a
transfer regardless of whether the transferee agrees to assume or pay the
debt."" The weight of this authority would seem to compel the application
of Crane to encumbered gifts and net gifts.
The extension of Crane is also supported by logical reasoning. The theory
of economic compulsion underlying the rationale of Crane applies to owners
of property, not just to purchasers."1 9 Mrs. Crane had not purchased the
apartment house; she inherited it. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Supreme
Court found her, as an heir, under the same economic compulsion as the
subsequent purchaser. Likewise, the purchaser in Crane was compelled to
pay the mortgage, not because he invested $3,000 cash, but because he
owned the mortgaged property. So long as the property was worth as much
as or more than the mortgage, the buyer-owner would naturally prefer to
pay the debt.1 20 In a sale, payment of boot may establish the prerequisite
that the property is worth more than the encumbrance, but it is neither
conclusive nor necessary in making this determination.' 2' The purchaser in
Crane would have felt the same compulsion to pay the mortgage had the
property been given to him without the exchange of a nominal cash consideration. 22 Therefore, on transfer of ownership, the grantor will enjoy
relief from the compulsion to discharge the encumbrance. Since this benefit
is the same whether property is sold or donated, gain should be recognized
in either instance when the encumbrance exceeds basis.
Policy considerations also militate in favor of the extension of Crane. The
relief from liability is a current pecuniary benefit enjoyed by the donor
on the transfer of encumbered property. As the person enjoying that benefit
the donor should naturally bear the appropriate tax burden arising therefrom. As the court in Johnson noted, there is no inequity in imposing the

1961-I U.S.T.C. 19136 (3d Cir. 1960); Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106, 1971-1
U.S.T.C. 19475 (N.D. Miss. 1971), af'd, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
117. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §357(c).
118. See also Rev. Rul. 70-626, 1970-2 CUM. BuLL. 158.
119. See text accompanying note 79 supra. 120. The Supreme Court in Crane left unsettled the effect of transferring property
encumbered in excess of its value. The Court expressly limited its holding to instances
in which the value of the property exceeded the mortgage. "Obviously if the value of
the property is less than the amount of the mortgage the mortgagor who is not personally
liable can not realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem
might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject
to the mortgage without receiving boot." Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37, 1947-1
U.S.T.C. 19217, at 12,431 n.37 (1947).
121. See Adams, supra note 80, at 169.
122. Cf. Berl, supra note 66, at 1044.
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